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On Replaceability

Peter Singer has shown how the
principle of utility, which enjoins us
(roughly) to maximize to balance of
nonmoral good over nonmoral evil,
justifies 'humane' treatment of ani
mals. 1 An excellent case against fac
tory farming, blood sports, and cur
rent methods of an imal laboratory
experimentation has been made on
utilitarian grounds. However, must a
utilitarian be opposed to all exploita
tion of animals' lives for human pleas
u re or profit? Not according to the
'replacement argument,' which tells us
that:
1. We ought to maximize util
ity (i.e., to maximize the
balance of nonmoral good
over nonmoral evil).
2. Utility would be maximized
if one were to use an ani
mal and kill it (for food or
research or anything else)
provided that the following
conditions are met:
(a)· the life of the animal is
on balance a Iife worth
living,
(b) the
animal
otherwise
would have no life at all
(would not exist),
(c) the sufferi ng of the
animal and those close to
it as a result of such
use and disposal is elimi
nated or minimized, and
(d) the· animal
will
be
replaced,
at or after
death, by another animal
for whom conditions (a),
(b), (c), and (d) hold.
3. Therefore, we ought to use
and kill animals provided
that conditions (a)
(d)
are met. 2
Classical utilita rian ism is committed
to this argument. As Singer says, it
. . rega rds sentient beings
as valuable only in so far as

they ma ke possible the exis
tence of intrinsically valuable
experiences like pleasure.
It
is as if sentient beings are
receptacles of something valua
ble and it does not matter if a
receptacle gets broken, so long
as there is another receptacle
to which the contents can be
transferred without any getting
spilt. 3
While it IS clear that captive ani
mals would be vastly better off under
such an arrangement than they are
now, is it really the case that 'hu
mane' farms and labs are morally jus
tifiable?
Moreover, what a re the
implications of this argument for the
treatment of humans?4 How can one
determine whether a normative ethical
theory has gone too fa r? Some brief
remarks about the nature of ethical
justification must be made before these
questions can be answered.
The major metaethical theories have
different implications about the precise
kind of justification normative ethical
claims can have.
According to natu
ralistic and nonnaturalistic metaethical
theories, ethical claims are factual
assertions which can in principle be
shown true or false.
(Naturalism
implies that ethical language users
believe there are natural ethical prop
erty instances; nonnaturalism implies
that ethical language users believe
there are nonnatural ethical property
instances.) Noncognitivist metaethical
theories, on the· other hand, imply
that ethical claims are not (at all or
merely, depending on the type of
noncognitivism) factual and thus are
neither true nor false. Some of these
major theories are much more plausible
than others, of course, but it would
go beyond the scope of this paper to
discuss
thei r
respective
merits. 5
Suffice it to say that it is fa r from
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obvious that ethical claims can be
given a straightforward justification.
This does not mean, however, that
it is doubtful that they can be justi
justified at all.
Ethical claims can be
rationally accepted or rejected even if
noncognitivism is true.
Ethical claims
are. standardly discounted if they fail
to be clearly thought out, fully
informed, and impartial. (It is crucial
to note that empathy [vividly imagin
imagining oneself in another's position] is
necessary for a fully informed judg
judgment about matters that concern sen
sentient beings.
It is a way of gaining
highly relevant information about the
effects of actions on such beings.
One must of course empathize equally
vividly with all sentient beings which
an action significantly concerns if one
is to be impartial.)
All the major
metaethical
theories are compatible
with these facts, as of cou rse they
must be in order to have a chance of
being correct. Even if ethical claims
are not assertions about the instantia
instantiation of natural or nonnatural proper
properties in acts, entities, or states of
affai rs, they a re made about acts,
entities, or states of affairs.
If one's
thin king is muddled, or if one is
ignorant of relevant facts, or if one is
biased and thus selectively aware of
only some of the relevant facts, one's
claim is unjustified:
one does not
know what one's claim is about.
Thus, even if there are no ethical
facts, one's ethical judgments can be
justified if they are shown to be qual
qualified by being clear, fully informed,
and impartial.' This also applies to
sets of ethical claims. They too must
be clear, coherent, informed, and
impartial. If an ethical claim or a set
of ethical claims is not qualified in
these
respects,
it is
discounted.
This method of justification,' which
I will follow R. B. Brandt in calling
'the qualified attitude method, '6 gives
us a way of rationally arguing about
ethical claims.
It also explains why
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qualified ethical 'intuitions' are the
touchstones of normative ethical theo
theories.
Without them, such theories
could
neither
be formulated
nor
tested. The qualified attitude method
does, however, have one difficulty.
It is theoretically possible that indi
individuals with equally qualified ethical
attitudes will disagree. Were this to
occur,
ethical
argumentation
must
cease.
Nevertheless, I would agree
with W. K.
Frankena
Fran kena that such a
disag reement is no more than a theo
theoretical possibility. 7
It is extraordi
extraordinarily difficult to come up with an
ethical disagreement in which both
sides a re equally qual ified.
Fran ke
kena's assertion will, however, .be tested
later in this paper. With this back
background in mind, let us now return to
the replacement a rgument and the
implications by which it will be tested.
We will begin by considering a
very
serious
implication
of
the
replacement argument:
if animals are
replaceable, so are human beings with
comparable characteristics in like cir
circumstances.
I will not here repeat
the extensive argumentation by phi
philosophers for the conclusion
that
preferential treatment for humans who
differ in no relevant respects from
animals cannot be justified and is in
fact speciesist (hence not impartial).
Many attempts have been made to jus
justify such preferential treatment, but
in my judgment none has succeeded. 8
If conditions (a) - (d) can be satis
satisfied by morons, stocking and using
them for food or experimentation is no
more or less reprehensible than doing
so with animals. Thus, if the ethical
belief "Morons should not be raised,
made into stew or used as lab sub
subjects, then replaced, but it is permis
permissible to treat animals in this way so
long as utility is maximized" is shown
to be unjustified (unqualified), one is
left to discard half of this conjunc
conjunction.
Most individuals facing this
th is choice
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would revise their beliefs about the
treatment of animals rather than opt
for moron stocking.
I believe such a
choice to be vey reasonable.
If one
fully considers the moron stocking
scena rio
ina
clea r,
empathetic,
impartial way, I find it hard to see
how one can accept it.
UnfortuUnfortu
nately, some philosophers do not find
it so hard to see and appear to be
willing to accept such a scenario.
Peter Singer has (courageously or
outrageously,
depending . on
one's
viewpoint) taken this position.
He
suggests that if the replacement argu
argument cannot be defeated "it is our
attitudes to mentally defective human
beings that are in need of reconsider'"
ation:" 9
This
involves
holding
that
mental defectives do not have a
right to life, and therefore
might be killed for food--if we
. should develop a taste for
human
flesh--or
(and
this
really might appeal to some
people) for the purpose of sci
scientific experimentation. 10
Singer seems in no way horrified by
this prospect. Elsewhere he says that
even nondefective human infants "are
as replaceable as merely conscious
an imals. "11 What can one say to a
philosopher like Singer who is willing
to make his ethical bel iefs consistent
and impartial by applying the replace
replaceability principle in this nonspeciesist
way?
One could try to argue that Sing
Singer's
position,
though
apparently
impartial, is not sufficiently clear or
well informed.
Such a response to
Singer would be very difficult to make
out and I am loathe to try it here. I
prefer to develop another objection to
the replacement argument which I do
not think Singer can successfully
cou nter, an objection wh ich wi II have
the indirect result of rejecting the
replacement argument for defective
humans.
Before proceeding with this
new objection, however, let it be
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noted that those who, unlike Singer,
do not accept the replaceability of
defective humans must reject the
replacement argument.
The next objection is this.
The
replacement argument as it stands has
an implication which would horrify
Singer.
It applies to any sentient
creatu re for whom conditions (a)
(d) are satisfied. It follows that even
normal humans are replaceable, so
long as utility is maximized.
As
Singer says, "Situations in which the
argument would apply to humans might
not be common,
but they could
occur."12 Even those who are willing
to accept the raising, eating, etc.,
and replacement of defective humans,
bal k at the notion that normal nonde
nondefective humans are in the same boat.
One who is disturbed by this implica
implication must eiher reject the replacement
argument wholly, i.e., for animals and
defective humans as well as normal
humans,
or
opt to
restrict the
replacement argument in such a way
that
it
cannot apply
to
normal
humans.
Since classical utilitarianism
leads to the replacement argument,
either choice implies its rejection as
well.
Singer chooses to replace classical
utilitarianism with another version of
utilitarianism which he believes allows
him to restrict the replacement argu
argument.
He first rejects a tempting
nonclassical-utilitarianism solution to
the problem,
'the prior existence
view,' according to which the princi
principle of utility applies only to beings
already in existence. 13 Although on
such a view utility could obviously
never be maximized by replacement of
sentient beings, it is impossible to
avoid the conclusion that the solution
is arbitrary as well as contrary to the
spirit of utilitarianism.
To say that
the principle of utility does not even
apply to those unborn is to open a
hornets' nest of difficulties. The dif
difficulty which troubles Singer is the
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implication that it would not be wrong
knowingly to conceive a child whose
physical defects would condemn it to a
brief life of wretched suffering. 14
would put the criticism more gener
generally.
A view which implies that
future generations simply do not count
in their own right (i.e., that we
should consider them only insofar as
they would affect those now existing)
clashes with our qualified ethical intu
intuitions.
Classical utilitarianism, which
bids us maximize the balance of total
utility over disutility, quite properly
does extend the principle of utility to
those who do not yet exist.
Instead
of accepting the prior ex istence view,
Singer chooses to adopt a utilitarian
utilitarianism which, like classical· utilitarianism,
does not restrict the princple of util
utility to those who already exist. This
view
is
'preference
utilitarianism.'
According to it, utility is directly
assigned to the preferences of beings
affected by actions, not merely to
their states of consciousness.
Killing
a being which has a preference to
continue living creates, other things
being equal, more disutility than kill
killing a being which has no such pref
preference.
It follows, Singer believes, that on
preference utilitarianism a living being
who prefers to live will be favored
over its merely potential replacement,
which can have no preference for life
since it does not yet exist. 1s This is
so even if the being is painlessly
killed all unsuspecting in its sleep:
even in that case, a preference has
been extinguished. The total amount
of happiness or satisfaction, etc.,
including that which a replacement
would
have,
is
still
taken
into
account:
it is the existing being's
preference to live which tips the
scales in its favor.
However, if an
existing being has no preference for
continued life, its demise will not cre
cre<;It" extra disutility,
If it WQuid not
otherwIse have been alive, has lived a
pleasant life, has had its suffering
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and what suffering others undergo on
its account minimized, and will be
replace by another bei ng who wou Id
live and die under the same condi
conditions, no preference utilitarian objec
objection would, believes Singer, be made.
What beings, according to Singer, can
have pleasant lives yet not prefer to
live? Beings who have no concept of
self:
'merely
conscious'
bei ngs.
Those who can have a preference for
continued life must be self-conscious.
Indeed, Singer apparently takes self
selfconsciousness to be sufficient as well
as necessary for such a preference.
He d raws the followi ng impl ication for
preference utilitarianism:
Self-conscious beings therefore
are not mere receptacles for
containing a certain quantity of
pleasu re, and a re not replace
replaceable
nonself-conscious
beings are replaceable. 16
The replacement argument is accord
accordingly restricted to beings who are not
self-con sciou s, a class wh ich excl udes
normal humans.
I n this way Si nger
believes he has avoided an unaccepta
unacceptable
consequence
of
the
orginal
replacement argument.
However, serious problems afflict
this attempt simultaneously to save
and restrict the replacement a rgu
rgument.
Fi rst, let us for the moment
not question the assumption
that
self-conscious beings are irreplaceable
on preference utilitarianism.
Now let
us ask if there are any conscious
beings who are 'merely'r conscious,
with no concept whatever of self.
Certainly
many
severely
defective
humans show signs of self-conscious
self-consciousness.
They perform actions, have
goals, show no tendency to confuse
themselves with table-legs, etc. Mon
Monkeys, apes, dogs, cats, horses, pigs,
sheep, etc., likewise exhibit behavior
which would be hard to explain with
without the postu lation of self-conscious
self-consciousness,
Even chickens seem to be,
however dimly,. aware of themselves.
They too have no tendency to confuse
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themselves with the rest of the world.
Furthermore, even the infant members
of these species exhibit such signs.
Though Singer is predictably not at
all distu rbed by the excl usion of adu It
monkeys, apes, and other 'higher'
animals from the class to which the
replacement argument applies, he con
continues to think that many sentient
beings will not be excluded (e.g.,
normal as well as defective human
infants, probably chickens,· and cer
certainly animals lower on· the evolution
evolutionary scale than chickens). 17
It is
highly doubtful that all these beings
can be made out to lack self-con
self-consciousness of any kind.
Clams and
oysters may not be self-conscious, but
the replacement argument would lose
most of its point if it were restricted
to them. (Although tasty, they ma ke
poor experimental subjects. )
Perhaps Singer would reply that
although babies and chickens cou ld be
said to be self-conscious, they are not
self-conscious enough to have a pref
preference for continued life.
(He would
then have to take self-consciousness
as such to be merely necessary for
the preference for continued life.)
But on what grounds are we to
declare that a baby or chicken has no
preference for continued life? What is
'life' but a series of experiences and
what is a preference for continued life
but the desi re for more experiences?
Is not the seeking of pleasure and the
avoidance of pain, clea rly exhibited
by the beings in question, sufficient
evidence for the desire to continue
living? If Singer wishes to claim that
such behavior is instinctive only he
would find himself at odds with many
current theorists about animal behav
behavior. Why insist that a baby or kitten
who seeks warmth, food, and compan
companionship, cannot prefer to continue liv
living?
The answer is that Singer appears
to be thinking that an animal or
human who prefers to live must have
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a very soph isticated conception of
itself. It must conceive of itself as "a
distinct entity with a possible futu re
existence. "18 If it has a more impov
impoverished conception of itself it "can
"cannot," as he puts it, "have a prefer
preference
about
its
own
futu re
existence."19
But to demand this
degree of sophistication is surely
unwarranted.
I suspect that this
demand has its origin in Singer's
uncritical acceptance of a faulty infer
inference by Michael Tooley, a philosopher
whose views on
self-consciousness
Singer uses to support preference
utilitarianism. 20 Tooley argues that
1. One can have a right to
life only if one is capable
of desiring life.
2. One can be capable of
desiring life only if one has
a concept of life.
3. The kind of life is question
is being a continuing sub
subject of experiences and
other mental states.
4. Therefore one can have a
right to life only if one has
a concept of bei ng a con
continuing subject of experi
experiences
and
other mental
states. 21
The inference to (3), as W. S. Pluhar
has pointed out,22 commits the inten
intentional fallacy.
One can desire life
without thinking of it in these highly
sophisticated terms just as one can
desire to meet Archibald Cox without
thinking of him as a Harvard law pro
professor. There is therefore no reason
to deny that sentient beings who
behave. as if they prefer to live do
prefer to live.
The replacement
argument as restricted by Singer
appears to be vastly more restricted
than he believes and thus looses its
point ..
Now, however, an even·more seri
serious objection can be raised.
The
first objection to the preference utilit
utilitarian version of the replacement argu
argument, just spelled out above, did not
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challenge the assumption that prefer
preference utilitarianism would imply that
self-conscious beings are irreplace
irreplaceable.
We saw that the argument,
given this assumption, appl ies to very
few sentient creatu res. A much more
serious problem arises for Singer
when we examine this assumption.
It
tu rns out to be simply false that
preference utilitarianism implies the
irreplaceability
of
self-conscious
bei ngs.
The problem is this. The replace
replacement for the painlessly, fearlessly
dispatched self-conscious being also
has a preference for continued life.
It is not different in th is respect from
its predecessor.
If the new prefer
preference and the old preference a re equal
in strength, they must be assigned
the same utility; therefore, preference
utilitarianism does
not favor
the
replacee over the replacer reg
regaa rdless
of whether the former is self-con
self-conscious.
Perhaps Singer would try to avoid
this (for his purposes, disastrous)
implication by arguing that a being
which does not yet exist (the. repla
replacer) cannot have any preferences.
All such preferences, he might say,
are potential only. There is evidence
that Singer would reply in that way.
He argues that . normal infants are
replaceable because they as yet have
no preference to continue living:
Potential self-consciousness is
not enough, for a potentially
self-conscious being has never
desired to go on living. 23
Similarly, an as yet nonexistent being
has no actual preference for continued
life. Thus, Singer could reply, pref
preference utilitarianism does indeed favor
the existent being with a preference
to continue living ovel' any nonexis
nonexistent replacement.
However, this line of reply is
actually closed to Singer, because it
presupposes an amalgam of preference
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utilitarianism with a view he rejects:
the prior existence view. The reader
will recall that in seeking to render
the replacement argument inapplicable
to normal, self-conscious humans he
rejected the prior existence view
(which does not assign utility to the
states of mind, etc., of nonexistent
beings) in favor of preference utilita
utilitarianism. 24
The prior existence view
was rejected because it did not imply
the wrongness of deliberately conceiv
conceiving
an
incurably
and
painfully
deformed child who would die before·
his second bi rthday.
Suppose that
the child's mind is unimpaired.
We
would then think it probable that he
would develop a preference for nonex
nonexistence. Yet such a preference would
simply not count if Singer were to try
to escape the disastrous implication in
the way I have suggested. Thus, his
view would be subject to the same
objection as the view he has rejected .
If Singer were to reply that he
would take the misery of the child
into account and thus condemn its
deliberate conception, then he ought
to take its potential preferences into
account as well.
Its misery is also
merely potential, after all.
And in
that case the preferences which any
nonexistent being will have ought to
be taken into account.
Thus, the
original objection reemerges:
preferprefer
ence utilitarianism does not favor the
self-conscious replacee over its self
selfconscious replacer if we can expect
the replacer's preference to live to be
at least as strong as the replacee's.25
I see no way in which Singer can
consist ently avoid this objection.
consistently
We have seen that when the
assumption that preference utilitarian
utilitarianism implies the irreplaceability of
self-conscious beings is not ques
questioned,
the
replacement
argument
applies to hardly any beings at all.
When the assumption is questioned,
the argument applies to all sentient
beings.
Both
alternatives
are
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unacceptable to Singer.
Therefore,
his attempt to restrict the replacement
argument to nonself-conscious animals
and humans has thoroughly defeated
itself.
In the absence of any other plausi
plausible new utilitarian version of the
replacement argument which
would
avoid the above entanglements, one is
entitled to conclude that the replace
replacement argument does indeed apply even
to normal humans.
Therefore either
the replacement argument, and utilita
utilitarianism, must be rejected, or the
implication must be accepted.
It is
now time to press the argument from
moral consistency on proponents of
the replacement argument.
Anyone
who,
on careful,
clear,
impartial
reflection, believes that it is wrong to
create, 'humanely' use, then replace
normal humans, will have to reject the
replacement argument for other sen
sentient beings as well. The principle of
utility must then be rejected as the
only·' basic moral principle.
Suppose, on the other hand, that
some utilitarians decide not to agree
with Singer's claim that
If we think of a living creature
as a self-conscious i ndivid ual,
leading its own life and with a
desire to go on living, the
replaceability argument holds
Iittle appeal. 26
It is enti rely possible that some wou Id
prefer to accept the replaceability of
normal humans rather that to reject
the replacement argument and utilita
utilitarianism.
They would probably argue
that they a re not impressed by an
appeal to ethical intuitions, that just
as they do not shy from the thesis
that defective humans a re replaceable,
they are willing to accept the replace
replaceability of humans like themselves.
"Why," they might say, "should we
abandon
utilitarianism
rather than
abandon an ethical intuition?"
Can
one ,'easonably counter such a draco
draconian moral consistency?
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I believe one can, by appealing to
a pragmatic version of the argument
from moral consistency. The principle
of utility is itself arrived at by appeal
to ethical intuitions. Various versions
of utilitarianism are likewise accepted
or rejected by utilitarians by such
appeals.
For example, Singer rejects
the prior existence view because it
has an implication "we would think . .
.wrong;"27 similarly, he raises doubts
about classical utilitarianism on the
grounds that "all this is, again, very
much at odds with our ordinary moral
convictions. "28 Moreover, utilitarians
have devoted a good deal of effort to
the task of showing some version of
utilitarianism consistent with standard
intuitions about lying, promise keep
keeping, and punishment of the innocent.
My point here is not merely to charge
any utilitarians who accept the impli
implications of the replacement argument
with inconsistency. I believe they are
entirely right to appeal to ethical
intuitions at these crucial points.
They are also right to insist that the
intuitions appealed to be qualified.
As mentioned earlier, without such
appeals ethical theories can neither be
formulated nor tested.
These reflec
reflections do however suggest that a util
utilitarian who relies on clear, informed,
impartial ethical intuitions in trying to
formulate his theory but who rejects
them when they run counter to his
theory is guilty of a pragmatic, if not
formal, inconsistency.
(If a utilita
utilitarian can show that the ethical intui
intuition that it is wrong to create, use,
and replace a normal human being is
not qualified in the above respects,
he is not guilty of this charge. How
However, no such thing has been shown.)
If then the principle of utility is,
after careful moral reflection,
not
taken to be the only basic moral prin
principle, we must look for an additional
principle (and thus to a deontological
theory) which do.es square with quali
qualified
ethical
intuitions
concerning
replaceability. To formulate and then
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defend such a principle is no easy
task.
I will here confine myself to
some brief remarks on this subject.
Tom Regan has been trying to formu
formulate such a principle in his recent
writings, and the results are very
suggestive.
Briefly, he a rgues that
if sentient (or non sentient) beings
have basic rights, they have those
rights because they are inherently
valuable.
He spells out the "most
noteworthy features" of inherent value
as follows:
1. If any given being (x) has
inherent value, then x's
h a v i n g val u e of t his kin dis
logically independent of any
other being's happening to
take an interest in or oth
otherwise valuing x.
2. X's having inherent value
makes it improper (a sign
of disrespect) to treat x as
though it had value only as
a means (i. e., only if and
only so long as it answers
another's needs, etc.).
3. Because x's having inher
inherent value underlies the
obligation to treat x with
respect, and since some
something's being
good-of-itsgood-of-its
kind is not a plausible
basis on which to found
this obligation, x's being
good-of-its-kind is logically
distinct from x's having
inherent· value. 29
Regan's 'criterion of inherent val
value' does seem to captu re the convic
conviction that stocking, eating or experi
experimenting on, and then replaci ng a
sentient creature with another just
like it and with the same fate, is to
treat it as instrumentally valuable. If
the being is in fact inherently valua-
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ble, such use seems wrong I even if
precautions have been taken to make
the being as happy as possible.
However, I do believe Regan errs in
stipulating that it is treatment of an
inherently valuable being as a means
only that is improper.
Under the
conditions of the replacement argu
argument, sentient bei ngs a re not treated
as means only:
their well-being is
taken into account in the attempt to
maximize the balance of inherent non
nonmoral value over disvalue.
(Current
treatment of animals, by contrast,
comes very close to treatment of them
as means only.) On the other hand,
it is clear that stocking, using, dis
disposing of, and replacing sentient cre
creatures, however benevolently this is
done, is to treat them primarily as
means.
Therefore I ' would suggest
amending Regan's feature (2) as fol
follows:
.
2. X's having inherent value
makes it improper (a sign
of disrespect) to treat x as
though it had val ue prima
primarily as a means.
Much work remains to be done on
the criterion of inherent value, as
Regan is the fi rst to say. 30
HowHow
ever, if the reasoning in the earlier
part of my paper is correct, and the
replacement argument must indeed be
rejected for humans and animals, the
formulation and testing of this or some
other principle as part of a deontolo
deontological theory is the next order of
business.
Evelyn B. Pluhar
Pennsylvania State University,
Fayette Campus
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